Crisis and Emergency Leadership

This module distinguishes incidents, emergencies, major incidents and crises, and sets out what each asks of leaders. It draws on Boin, 't Hart, Stern and Sundelius's definition of crisis as threat, urgency and uncertainty together, their five critical leadership tasks, and Keith Grint's tame, wicked and critical problems. Gene Kranz and Apollo 13 show why naming one goal matters so much.

This module examines the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as the legal backbone of civil protection, and what its duties ask of leaders. It covers Category 1 and Category 2 responders, the seven Category 1 duties, JESIP, resilience structures in Wales, the triple lock on Part 2 emergency powers, why the Act went unused during Covid-19, and the review now under way.

This module traces how resilience is being rebuilt in the UK and Wales, from Exercise Cygnus in 2016 to Exercise Pegasus in 2025 and beyond. It covers the three principles of the UK Government Resilience Framework, likelihood and impact in the National Risk Register, the Wales Resilience Framework and its link to the Well-being of Future Generations Act, and stronger Local Resilience Forums.

This module explores how public service organisations keep the services people depend on running when normal conditions fail. It sets out the Business Continuity Institute's six professional practices, business impact analysis and its recovery terms, ISO 22301, ISO 22316 and the Civil Contingencies Act duty. The British Library cyber attack of 2023 shows how legacy infrastructure and candour shape recovery.

This module looks at how organisations rehearse for crises and why lessons identified are so often not learned. It covers Weick and Sutcliffe's five principles of high-reliability organisations, the main types of exercise, the gap between lessons identified and lessons learned, and after action review. Exercise Cygnus in 2016 shows the distance between knowing and being ready.

This module covers the structures that organise a multi-agency emergency and the local authority's place within them. It explains strategic, tactical and operational command, the Strategic, Tactical and Recovery Co-ordinating Groups, what councils bring, and the discipline of the decision log. Storm Dennis in Rhondda Cynon Taf shows command and community working together, and the first hours of strategic leadership.

This module looks at how organisations with different cultures, structures and language act as one response. It sets out the five JESIP principles, the METHANE incident message and the Joint Decision Model, and draws on Amy Edmondson's idea of teaming. The 2010 Chilean mine rescue, read through Rashid, Edmondson and Leonard's envisioning, enrolling and engaging, shows why interoperability is a relationship.

This module examines how experienced people decide fast, why groups stall, and how to make decisions you can defend. It covers Snowden and Boone's Cynefin framework, Gary Klein's recognition primed decision model, Karl Weick's sensemaking and Alison's research on decision inertia. Captain Sullenberger's 208 second decision brings recognition to life, and the module closes with a discipline for defensible decisions.

This module covers warning, informing and advising people in ways that are timely, accurate, credible and humane. It sets out the Civil Contingencies Act duty to warn, inform and advise, Coombs's situational crisis communication theory, a sensemaking practice loop, and the six CERC principles of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Welsh Government communication during Covid-19 shows how consistency builds trust.

This module examines how to look after the people who carry a crisis response. It draws on Amy Edmondson's psychological safety, Ronald Heifetz's holding environment, Maslach and Leiter's three dimensions of burnout and the work of Shay and Litz on moral injury, with the UK Covid-19 Inquiry's findings on health and care staff. It sets out WHO psychological first aid, TRiM and NICE NG116, and why recovery belongs inside the response.

This module examines the UK Covid-19 Inquiry's first report, published in July 2024 under Baroness Hallett, and its finding that the UK was prepared for the wrong pandemic. It covers labyrinthine structures, flawed risk assessment, Exercise Cygnus and the gap between lessons identified and learned, Irving Janis's groupthink and red teams, the ten recommendations, and progress since, including Exercise Pegasus and the Wales Resilience Framework.

This module examines the UK Covid-19 Inquiry's second report, published on 20 November 2025, on core decision making across the UK and devolved governments. It covers the finding of too little, too late, the estimated cost of a week's delay in March 2020, the culture at the centre of government, and Wales's careful approach and late timing, read through Boin and colleagues, Cynefin and Alison's decision inertia.

This module examines what the Grenfell Tower Inquiry asks of institutions, landlords and local leaders, holding in mind the 72 people who died on 14 June 2017. It covers the Phase 2 finding that every death was avoidable, systematic dishonesty by product manufacturers, residents' warnings that were dismissed, failures in response and recovery, the Social Housing (Regulation) Act 2023 and what government has done since.

This module examines what the Manchester Arena Inquiry found about the emergency response to the attack of 22 May 2017, in which 22 people were killed. It covers Volume 2's finding of a nearly complete foundering of JESIP, the uncommunicated Operation Plato declaration, the Kerslake Report, why declaring is not the same as telling, and Martyn's Law, the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025.

This module examines what recovery owes people, from the handover by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group to the long years that follow. It covers the four dimensions of recovery in UK guidance, humanitarian assistance with dignity drawn from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry, communities as responders, and the Aberfan disaster of 1966, through to the Disused Mine and Quarry Tips (Wales) Act 2025.

This module examines how organisations turn lessons identified into lessons learned after an emergency. It covers what public inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005 can and cannot do, the Hillsborough families' campaign and the proposed Hillsborough Law, the Welsh NHS duty of candour from April 2023, and the Covid-19 PPE high priority lane, treating candour as a daily practice of leadership.

This capstone module reads three very different emergencies through the lenses of the whole topic: the Salisbury nerve agent incident of 2018, Storm Arwen's power cuts in 2021 and the CrowdStrike outage of 19 July 2024. Drawing on Boin and colleagues, Cynefin, the Civil Contingencies Act, JESIP, CERC, the Dawn Sturgess Inquiry and Ofgem's review, it closes with the emergency management cycle and leading before, during and after.